As we saw in the last post, fire causalities have tragic consequences when the small details are overlooked. An untrained maintenance worker, incomplete fire safety plans or shoddy work. When did you last look at your fire-prevention plan and the necessary tasks that need doing?

One would think that airports would be amongst some of the most security and safety aware facilities, however on 11 April 1996, a fire began inside the passenger terminal of Düsseldorf Airport, Germany, killing 17 people and injuring sixty to eighty. The fire is considered a prime example of a polystyrene fire and involved approximately 1000 firefighters to extinguish the blaze.

Background

In 2010, Dusseldorf airport was the third busiest airport in Germany with just short of 19 million passengers passing through. It is the largest and primary airport for the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region – the largest metropolitan region in Germany and among the largest metropolitan areas of the world. At the time of the fire, it was one of the busiest airports in Germany.

Fire causes

The fire was caused by welding work done to an expansion joint on the elevated access road of Terminal A, which began at around 13:00. Droplets of molten metal from the welding caused the polystyrene insulation in the ceiling above the arrivals hall to start smouldering. This slow fire spread out over a large area without being noticed.

At about 15:30 a taxi driver observed a few sparks falling from the ceiling and notified the fire brigade. Two members of the airport fire crew arrived a few minutes later suspecting an electrical failure. At around 15:45 they learned of the welding that was done and could finally identify the probable origin. By this stage, smoke was coming out of vents. Meantime the smouldering polystyrene and released gasses had reached auto ignition temperature and a flashover occurred. Almost immediately, one hundred square metres of ceiling was blazing accompanied by thick black smoke.

A total of eleven tons of polystyrene burned as well as PVC cabling thereby releasing highly toxic substances such as carbon monoxide, dioxins, cyanides, and hydrogen chloride. As there were no sprinklers or fire doors which were not mandatory at the time, a wall of smoke spread through the terminal building.

At about 16:00 the airport fire brigade was informed about the extent of the fire and called out the local fire brigades. The airport fire crew were trained to manage aviation incidents and did not have experience in dealing with building fires and were lacking necessary equipment.

At 16:06, a general call for evacuation was put on the public address system of the airport. Up to that point, people in other parts of the airport were not aware of the situation. All flight operations were stopped at 13:36. The fire was under control by 19:20 and declared extinguished at 21:30.

Victims

All the victims died from smoke inhalation and not due to injuries from the fire. Passengers were trapped inside one of the Airline lounges on the mezzanine level above the arrivals hall and nine were found dead. This self-service lounge was not staffed as eligible passengers were given an access code upon check-in.

This may have contributed to their inability to access the nearest escape route which was only eight metres away from the lounge exit. Numerous phone calls were made from inside the lounge and although one of the victims said they were above the Lufthansa check-in; personnel were unaware of the exact location. One person managed to smash a window with a chair and escaped but was injured after falling four metres.

Seven people died in the elevators between the parking and the terminal. Unaware of the fire they boarded the two elevators and when the doors opened, they were exposed to the thick smoke which obstructed the optical door sensors causing the doors to remain open. One victim died in the restrooms.

Aftermath

Both terminals were unusable, and the total damage was approximately five hundred million Euros. Several airlines temporarily moved their operations to other airports.

The official investigation into the accident revealed several fire causes, safety, and procedural flaws:

• The airport fire brigade had not been informed about the welding work, otherwise a fire watch would have been dispatched.
• The highly flammable polystyrene sheeting inside the ceiling was installed illegally.
• There were no operational procedures for a fire inside the terminal building. Firefighters were missing floor plans and access keys, and communication problems were encountered between members of the airport fire brigade and external forces.
• The elevators were not put out of service once the general fire alarm was called.

Takeaway

Is your building or workplace compliant with building regulations? Are the fire-doors, exits and signage appropriate. Do you have a sprinkler system and a functioning fire alarm? If present are your proto teams well trained? Do you have a hot-work permit system in place and is it rigorously followed?

For assistance and advice whatever your requirements, give Firebrand a call – better safe than sorry!